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Abstract
Why women avoid participating in a competition and how can we encourage them to
participate in it? In this paper, we investigate how social image concerns affect women’s
decision to compete. We first construct a theoretical model and show that participating in
a competition, even under affirmative action policies favoring women, is costly for women
under public observability since it deviates from traditional female gender norms, resulting
in women’s low appearance in competitive environments. We propose and theoretically show
that introducing prosocial incentives in the competitive environment is effective and robust
to public observability since (i) it induces women who are intrinsically motivated by prosocial
incentives to the competitive environment and (ii) it makes participating in a competition
not costly for women from social image point of view. We conduct a laboratory experiment
where we randomly manipulate the public observability of decisions to compete and test
our theoretical predictions. The results of the experiment are fairly consistent with our
theoretical predictions. We suggest that when designing policies to promote gender equality
in competitive environments, using prosocial incentives through company philanthropy or
other social responsibility policies, either as substitutes or as complements to traditional
affirmative action policies, could be promising.
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1 Introduction
While women in many developed countries are attaining higher education at similar rates
as men, the gender gap in earnings still exists and women are significantly less likely to
hold executive positions in firms. In addition to the more traditional explanations for gender
differences in labor market outcomes such as discrimination, the gender differences in abilities
and preferences over jobs, another important factor that nowadays economists believe that
is important is the gender differences in competitiveness. Seminal work by Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) find that men choose to enter a tournament in the laboratory twice as
many as women, despite no difference in performance. A number of experimental researches
have replicated the result of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and, recently, there is mounting
evidence of gender differences in competitiveness measured in the laboratory correlates with
the decisions and outcomes in the field (e.g. Buser et al., 2014; Reuben et al., 2015; Berge et
al., 2015; Alm˚as et al., 2016; Yagasaki and Nakamuro, 2018).1
Obviously, from an efficiency point of view, it is costly if women with the highest ability
do not apply jobs that they are best suited because of its competitive screening process. It
is therefore important to ask why women avoid participating in a competition and how can
we encourage them to participate in it.
Most of the prior research take the gender differences in competitiveness as given and
investigated the effect of affirmative action policies favoring women (Niederle et al., 2013;
Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012). This strand of research generally show that affirmative ac-
tion policies such as quotas or preferential treatments are successful in encouraging high
performing women to enter competitions and, despite the usual criticism for causing reverse
discrimination, there is limited or no efficiency cost.
However, an important point which has been neglected from the prior research is the
effect of social image concerns on women’s decision to compete. In reality, many of our daily
activities are observed by the people around us such as colleagues or classmates. There, it is
important for us to think about, at least to some extent, how our behavior will be perceived
by others. In fact recent literature of economics has shown surprising degree of influence
of such social image concerns in many areas including charitable donation (e.g. Ariely et
al., 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012), education (e.g. Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015; Bursztyn et
al., 2017a), and voting (e.g. Gerber et al., 2008). 2 Especially, independently from our work,
Bursztyn et al. (2017b) provide evidence suggesting that single women might hesitate to show
characteristics regarded as “ambitious” or “acting male” under a public situation because it
hurts them in the dating market. These results suggest that, even if we attempt to encourage
women’s participation in competitions by introducing affirmative action policies, its effect may
be limited to the extent that social image of women participating in competitions departs
from traditional female gender norms.
In this paper, we investigate how social image concerns affect women’s decision to compete
1See Niederle (2017) for a survey.
2See Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) for a survey.
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under three different situations: baseline treatment (no intervention), preferential treatment
which is one form of affirmative action policies that preferentially treats competing women,
and prosocial incentive treatment under which the donation opportunity is associated to the
competitive environment. We first construct a simple theoretical model that incorporates
social image concerns with the standard economic incentives when deciding whether to com-
pete and generate predictions. Our model assumes that there are two types of women; female
stereotypical types and male stereotypical types. Women with female stereotypical types are
assumed to be intrinsically female stereotypical, i.e. have high cost in participating in com-
petition and have high motives to contribute to the society. On the other hand women with
male stereotypical types are assumed to be more manly, i.e. have lower cost participating in
competition and more selfish than women with female stereotypical types. We show that if
women are strongly motivated to signal that they are of female stereotypical types, due to
the dating market concerns (e.g. Fisman et al., 2006; Bursztyn et al., 2017b) or more psycho-
logical such as a direct shame effect of “acting male”, participating in a competition under
baseline or affirmative action policies is costly from a social image point of view resulting
in low participation rates under public environment. On the other hand, participating in
a competition with prosocial incentives is not costly from social image point of view since
it does not contradicts with the female stereotypical behavior which suggests women to be
socially oriented. Therefore, our model suggests that introducing prosocial incentives to the
competitive environment plays two roles: (i) it induces women who are intrinsically motivated
by prosocial incentives to the competitive environment and (ii) it makes participating in a
competition not costly for women from social image point of view.
Based on these theoretical predictions, we conduct a laboratory experiment based on
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and test these hypothesis. In our experiment, we randomly
assigned sessions into two conditions: “private” and “public”. In the private condition, sub-
jects’ decision to compete in the experiment were kept completely private as in the standard
design. On the other hand in the public condition, subjects were told that their decisions in
the experiment would be made public to the subjects participated in the same session at the
end of the experiment. We investigate the impacts of this public observability on women’s de-
cision to compete under above three different situations: baseline, preferential and prosocial
incentive treatments.
Our experimental results are fairly consistent with the theoretical predictions. We find
that both preferential and prosocial incentive treatments are effective in inducing women
to competitions in the private condition. However, when decisions to compete are made
public, we observe statistically significant declines in women’s tournament participation rate
in baseline and preferential treatments but not in the prosocial incentive treatment which
support our theoretical predictions. On the other hand, we see no statistically significant
effect under public observability for men in each treatment. The results are further supported
by the regression analysis and robust to additional controls. Overall, we have experimentally
identified significant impacts of social image concerns on women’s decision to compete and
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find that prosocial incentive treatment are robust to those concerns.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper adds to at least three strands of research. First, it adds to the literature of gen-
der differences in competitiveness and the effects of policy interventions on women’s decision
to compete (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Niederle et al., 2013; Balafoutas and Sut-
ter, 2012). The present paper contributes to this literature by showing that a social image
concern as a significant factor that explains women’s underrepresentation in competitive envi-
ronments. There are two related research that study the effect of other-regarding preferences
on women’s decision to compete. Cassar et al. (2016) collected data from parents of middle
and high school students in China and show that using child-benefiting voucher as rewards
remove the gender differences in competitiveness of those parents. Samek (2015) uses a large
field experiment and show that introducing job within prosocial framing increases its appli-
cation rates. Although these studies are similar in motivations to our paper, they do not
consider robustness of the results to public situations which is unique in our study.
Secondly, the study also has a clear link to the literature of the effects of prosocial incen-
tives on labor market outcomes. There are numerous experimental researches that demon-
strated the effectiveness of prosocial incentives on workers effort or performance (e.g. Tonin
and Vlassopoulos, 2010, 2015; Imas, 2014; Charness et al., 2016; DellaVigna and Pope, 2016).
While most of the previous research show that prosocial incentives are powerful to induce
effort or enhance productivity in a given working environment, there are relatively few re-
search studying whether prosocial incentives are enough to motivate workers to self select
into such an environment. Indeed, it has been noted by Lazear et al. (2012) the importance
of self selection in economic experiments, especially in the context of social preferences. Our
paper, as well as Cassar et al. (2016) and Samek (2015), compliments the previous research
in that it asks how effective are prosocial incentives in motivating workers to self-select an
competitive environment. We show that prosocial incentives are effective and robust to the
situations where decisions are publicly observed.
Finally, our paper adds to the recent growing literature of social pressure or social image
concerns including charitable donation (Ariely et al., 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2012), education
(e.g. Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015; Bursztyn et al., 2017a), and voting (e.g. Gerber et al., 2008).
The most closely related paper to our paper is Bursztyn et al. (2017b). Bursztyn et al. (2017b)
find that in a survey to be used by students’ career advisers, single, female MBA students
under-report their financial ambitions, their willingness to have longer work hours and to
travel for work, and some of their personality traits (such as ambition and leadership in
day-to-day interactions) when they believe that their classmates will observe their choice.
These effects are much weaker among married female students and are not present among
male students. Similar to them we also show that, by making use of a controlled laboratory
experiment, women avoid participating in competitions, which is generally regarded as a part
of male gender norms, when their decisions are observed by others. However, in contrast to
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Bursztyn et al. (2017b), we move one step further and ask how can we mitigate the negative
effect of social pressure or social image concerns on women’s decision to compete and show
that using prosocial incentives would be a promising approach since it generates positive
social image on participating in competitions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper proposing such an idea to mitigate the effects of social pressure.3
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we construct the theoretical
model that incorporates social image concerns when deciding whether to compete and gen-
erates theoretical predictions of each treatment. In Section 3 we describe the design of the
experiment and state our main testing hypothesis. The results are discussed in Section 4 and
Section 5 discusses the policy implication of the results and concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we construct a simple theoretical model in order to clarify the role social image
concerns plays in women’s decision to compete. Various simplifying assumptions imposed on
the model are not essential in generating our hypotheses. We first clarify why affirmative
action policies such as quotas or preferential treatments, as well as baseline, could be fragile
to public observability.
The model below basically follows the framework first proposed in Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006) and is a direct extension of the model in Bursztyn et al. (2017a). There is also a clear
link between our model and the identity model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
2.1 Baseline and Affirmative Action Policies
2.1.1 Baseline
Suppose there is a continuum of women and assume that they have to decide whether to
participate in a competition that delivers benefit bT if they win the competition and zero if
not. The winning probability of the competition is denoted as w ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand,
if they decide not to compete, then they receive bP for sure. We assume that there are two
types of women τi ∈ {f,m} which is private information. Here, women of type f , referred
to as women with female stereotypical types, are interpreted as intrinsically stereotypical
women while those whose type is m, referred to as women with male stereotypical types, are
interpreted as more manly than women with female stereotypical types. We denote the share
of women with male stereotypical types by q; Pr(τi = m) = q. Each of gender types is of
two dimensional and g = (cg, θg) where g = f,m. The first component cg is a cost associated
with participating in competitions and we will assume that 0 = cm < wbT − bP < cf . In
words, women with male stereotypical types have no cost participating in a competition
but women with female stereotypical types have high cost participating in a competition.
3See Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) for a discussion of how one can shape the effects of social pressure. Our idea
is not discussed there.
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The second component θg represents the degree of women’s altruism and we assume that
θm < 0 < θf − cf . This represents that women with female stereotypical types are more
altruistic or socially minded compare to the women with male stereotypical types. 4 If a
woman enters the competition, the total payoff is,
wbT − ci + λPr(τi = f | di = 1),
whereas if a woman does not participate in the competition, her total payoff is,
bP + λPr(τi = f | di = 0).
The last term represents the benefit of being perceived as female stereotypical types given
their choices and λ ≥ 0 captures the strength of such social image concerns. The underlying
mechanism that generates this utility could be dating or marriage markets concerns (e.g.
Fisman et al., 2006; Bursztyn et al., 2017b) or more psychological such as a direct shame
effect of “acting male”.
This setting is completely analogous to Bursztyn et al. (2017a) with minor notational
differences. The following proposition corresponds to Proposition 1 in Bursztyn et al. (2017a)
and state that, if the decision to compete is publicly observed, women are discouraged to
enter into the competitive environment because of the social image concerns. Throughout,
we denote r = Pr(di = 1 | τi = f) and ρ = Pr(di = 1 | τi = m).
Proposition 1. (i) If λ ≤ wbT − bP , r = 0 and ρ = 1, (ii) if λ ∈
(
wbT − bP , wbT−bP1−q
)
, r = 0
and ρ = 1q (1− λwbT−bP (1− q)) ∈ (0, 1) and (iii) if λ ≥
wbT−bP
1−q , r = 0 and ρ = 0.
2.1.2 Affirmative Action Policies Favoring Women
Consider the same model but with affirmative action policies favoring women. Note that
affirmative action policies such as quotas or preferential treatments increase women’s winning
probability of the competition. Then let wA be the winning probability under an affirmative
action policy and suppose 0 = cm < cf < wAbT − bP . This assumption guarantees that the
affirmative action policy is effective enough to encourage women with female stereotypical
types to participate in a competition under a private situation. However, still in this case,
the participation rate converges to zero as λ gets larger.
Propostion 2. (i) if 0 ≤ λ ≤ wAbT−bP−cfq , r = 1 and ρ = 1, (ii) if wAbT − bP − cf ≤ λ ≤
wAbT−bP−cf
q , r =
q
1−q
λ−(wAbT−bP−cf )
wAbT−bP−cf and ρ = 1, (iii) if wAbT − bP − cf ≤ λ ≤ wAbT − bP ,
4In this modeling strategy, we assume that preference for competitions and degree of altruism perfectly correlate.
This is just for a simplification but there are some empirical evidences that support this assumption (e.g. Bartling
et al., 2009; Balafoutas et al., 2012; Samak and Sheremeta, 2013). In the following analysis, we also see that WTP
for donation, which is a measure of altruism in our analysis, negatively correlates with tournament entry in the
private condition (see Table 3).
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r = 0 and ρ = 1, (iv) if wAbT − bP ≤ λ ≤ wAbT−bP1−q , r = 0 and ρ = 1q (1 − λwAbT−bP (1 − q)),
(v) if wAbT−bP1−q ≤ λ, r = 0 and ρ = 0. 5
2.2 Introducing Prosocial Incentives
The reason why baseline and affirmative action policies were fragile to public observability was
that women with female stereotypical types always had a weaker incentive to participate in the
competition compare to women with male stereotypical types. This made the noncompetitive
environment always beneficial from social image point of view and uniquely supported the
equilibrium with no participation for λ sufficiently large by D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps,
1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987).
The idea here is to use prosocial incentives to reverse this relationship. We expect in-
troducing prosocial incentives in the competitive environment plays two roles: (i) it induces
women with female stereotypical types, who are intrinsically motivated by prosocial incen-
tives, to a competition and (ii) it makes participating in a competition not costly for women
since women with female stereotypical types are now having stronger incentive to partici-
pating in it. In contrast to affirmative action policies, (ii) makes the effect of introducing
prosocial incentives on women’s decision to compete robust to the public observability.
Suppose if women participate in a competition, in addition to financial reward bT , they
are given an opportunity to make charitable donation if they win. Denote ai ∈ {0, 1} a
discrete decision whether to make charitable donation or not. Then, the payoff obtained by
participating in the competition is given by,
max
ai∈{0,1}
w(bT + θiai)− ci + λPr(τi = f | ai, di = 1),
whereas the payoff of not participating in the competition is the same with the previous cases.
Since we are assuming θm < 0 < θf − cf , note that now women with female stereotypical
types always have a stronger incentive to participate in a competition compare to the women
with male stereotypical types.
The following Proposition 3 shows that, indeed, this treatment accomplishes full partici-
pation for any λ ≥ 0. The only decision that λ matters is the decision to donate. Throughout
we denote rT = Pr(ai = 1 | τi = f, di = 1) and ρT = Pr(ai = 1 | τi = m, di = 1).
Proposition 3. For every λ ≥ 0, r = 1 and ρ = 1. In addition, (i) if 0 ≤ λ ≤ −wθm, rT = 1
and ρT = 0, (ii) if −wθm ≤ λ ≤ −wθm1−q , rT = 1 and ρT = 1− 1q (1 +λ 1−qwθm ), (iii) if λ ≥ −wθm1−q ,
then rT = 1 and ρT = 1.
Finally, before moving on, it is worthwhile to mention the case of men. For men, all of the
previous analysis can be easily adjusted by assuming that men benefit from being perceived
by others as male stereotypical types given their choices. In this case, the model predicts
5Note that the equilibrium in (ii) is unstable with respect to perturbation in λ.
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that men are encouraged to enter into the competitive environment when the decision is
publicly observed by others so long as λ is large. However, in the previous literature, there
is evidence that men are not so sensitive to social image concerns compare to women and
public observability has little impact on behaviors for men Ariely et al. (e.g. 2009); Bursztyn
et al. (e.g. 2017b). Therefore, we expect that the effect of public observability is small or
approximately zero (i.e., λ = 0) in contrast to women and mainly focus on women in the
following analysis.
3 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted in November, December of 2016. We conducted 12 sessions
in total, 10 at the University of Tokyo, 2 at Keio University. Our subjects were drawn
from students in the University of Tokyo, Keio University, Waseda University. Subjects were
recruited through fliers posted throughout the campus, handed out and uploaded on Twitter
and Facebook by our research assistants. We randomly chose 150 subjects for both men and
women from the students who were interested in our research and had registered at an online
web site. Finally 279 subjects (138 men, 141 women) participated in the experiment. In this
paper, however, we only utilize the sample of students in the University of Tokyo. All those
students were participating in the sessions conducted at the University of Tokyo. This leaves
us with a sample of 188 subjects (97 men, 91 women). 6
Upon arrival, subjects were told that they would receive a participation fee, 4000 yen, and
that they might earn additional money, 2000 yen on average, depending on their performance
in the experiment. 7
Our experimental design basically follows the standard experimental design as in Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007). At the start of the experiment, subjects were told they were randomly
divided into groups of 3 men and 3 women and that they would be performing a number of
tasks. One of these would be randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. In
each round subjects had 3 min to solve as many as possible mazes as in Figure 1 below.
Before starting the first task, subjects were given an instruction of how to solve mazes,
and given an opportunity of 3 min practice. Subjects were informed of the nature of the task
to be carried out and the payment scheme only immediately before performing the task. The
specific payment schemes of the first two rounds are the followings.
Round 1: Piece Rate. Subjects were asked to solve as many mazes as possible in 3 min.
They would receive 50 yen for each maze correctly solved if this task was randomly selected
6 In total, subjects were 188 from the University of Tokyo, 69 from Keio University, 22 from Waseda University.
We omit 91 data from Keio and Waseda University. The results do not change qualitatively even if we include those
samples.
7They were also informed that they had to come to the University of Tokyo or Keio University later to receive
their total fee. Our participation fee is relatively high compared to the literature since it includes the transportation
cost during the experiment.
8
Figure 1: an example of maze
for payment.
Round 2: Compulsory Tournament. Subjects were asked to solve as many mazes as
possible in 3 min. If this task was randomly selected for payment, the two subjects who
solved the largest number of correct mazes in the group each would receive 150 yen for each
maze correctly solved while the other subjects would receive no payment. In case of ties the
winner were chosen randomly.
In rounds 3 to 5, in order to asses the impacts of different compensation schemes, we use a
within-subjects design. Subjects sequentially faced with the following treatments, with the
treatment order was randomly assigned to rounds 3 to 5 to minimize order effects, and had
to choose under which payment scheme their next performance would be compensated.
Baseline Treatment. Subjects were asked to choose either piece rate or tournament and
then solve as many mazes as possible in 3 min. Payment would depend on which payment
scheme they chose if this round was randomly selected for payment. If a subject were to
choose piece rate, she would get 50 yen per maze solved correctly. If she chose tournament,
she would get 150 yen per maze solved correctly if her score exceeded that of at least 4 of the
other group members in round 2, otherwise she would receive no payment. In case of ties the
winner were chosen randomly.
Preferential Treatment. In preferential treatment, each woman’s performance was auto-
matically increased by one unit (i.e., one correct maze). Given the augmented scoring rule
for women, subjects were asked to choose either piece rate or tournament and then solve as
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many mazes as possible in 3 min. Payment were determined according to the rules of the
baseline treatment.
Prosocial Incentive Treatment. In prosocial incentive treatment, subjects were allowed
to donate from their rewards to a charity organization only when they chose tournament.
Subjects were asked to choose either piece rate or tournament and then solve as many mazes
as possible in 3 min. In addition, if they were to choose tournament, they were told that they
could decide how much of a 150 yen per one correct maze if they won to keep for themselves
and how much to pass on to a charity of their choice.
In addition to the above standard design that follows Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we
randomly manipulate the publicly observability of decisions during the experiment to see
how social image concerns affect the decisions to compete. We randomly assigned private
and public conditions to sessions.
Private Condition. Subjects decisions were kept private throughout the experiment as in
the standard literature.
Public Condition. Subjects were told that there decisions to choose piece rate or tour-
nament would be made public to subjects participating in the same session. In prosocial
incentive treatment, in addition, subjects were told that the amount shared to the charity
would be also made public if they chose tournament.
In summary, our experimental design is a combination of within-subject design, which is
designed to see how each treatment affects the decisions, and between-subject design, which
is designed to see how public observability affects the decisions and to explore the robustness
of effects of each treatment.
Questionnaires. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to answer the post-
experimental questionnaire. As well as demographic and socio-economic questions, question-
naires include subjects’ guess of their relative rank in compulsory tournament, both subjective
and objective risk attitude and willingness to pay (WTP) for donation. WTP for donation
is used to estimate how much each subject valued the donation opportunity in the prosocial
incentive treatment and interpreted as a measure of altruism in our analysis.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We will be examining tournament entry choice and see whether making the decisions public
has an effect or not. In doing so, we wish to control for ability, confidence, risk attitudes and
the level of altruism that could affect the decisions of tournament entry. Table 1 and 2 show
the summary statistics by gender.
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There are no statistical differences between subjects in public and private conditions for
most of the variables but we see a few important differences between these groups. For men,
subjects in the public treatment are significantly more risk seeking, in the sense that they
choose more risky lotteries, than those in the private condition (see Table 1). On the other
hand, for women, subjects in the public condition are less confident, have higher WTP for
donation (see Table 2). These observable differences are important in our analysis since these
differences itself could generate differences in tournament entry choice between subjects in
public and private conditions.8 Therefore, we will control for these differences in the analysis
below.
3.2 Testing Hypothesis
Based on the previous theoretical analysis, we state the following testing hypothesis regarding
the effects of each intervention and the public observability on women’s decision to compete.
First, we expect both preferential treatment and prosocial incentive treatment are effective
in inducing women to competitive environment when decisions are completely private.
Hypothesis 1. When decisions are private, we expect women’s higher tournament participa-
tion rate in both preferential and prosocial incentive treatment than in the baseline treatment.
Our model also predicts that making the decision to compete public would discourage women’s
tournament participation in baseline and preferential treatments. On the other hand, we
expect there is no such an effect in prosocial incentive treatment and thus prosocial incentive
treatment is robust to public observability.
Hypothesis 2.
(i) When decisions are public, we expect women’s lower tournament participation rate in
both baseline and preferential treatment than in the respective private case.
(ii) We expect no significant difference in women’s tournament participation rate in proso-
cial incentive treatment.
4 Results
In this section we will present our experimental results and discuss whether the results are
consistent to the stated testing hypothesis. Our preliminary results are displayed in Figure 2
which represents the proportion of subjects who choose tournament in each treatment.
8The observed imbalance between subjects in public and private conditions may itself be caused by making the
decisions public in the public condition. Indeed, in the literature of self-presentation in social psychology, there
is an evidence in which behaviors performed under public observability change the self-concept of individuals and
result in the change in behaviors (see Tice (1992)). If that is the case, variables which are not balanced should
be omitted from the analysis since those are outcomes of the treatment. Therefore, in the following analysis, we
assume that this is not the case and use those variables as controls.
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First of all, in the baseline, although the difference is not statistically significant (tourna-
ment entry rate among women and men, respectively: 0.46, 0.57, p= 0.30), we observe that
women are 11 percentage points less likely to enter into the tournament in the private condi-
tion. In the public condition, however, there is a significant gender difference in tournament
entry rate (0.24, 0.65, p = 0.000). Compared to the private condition, women entering into
the tournament significantly decreased from 0.46 to 0.24 (p = 0.034), which is consistent to
hypothesis 2(i), while men increased their entering into the tournament from 0.57 to 0.65 but
not significant (p = 0.416).
Secondly, in the private condition, the introduction of preferential treatment increased
women entering the tournament from 0.46 to 0.63 and decreased men from 0.57 to 0.41 and
the impacts are statistically significant for both women and men (p = 0.032 and p = 0.034 for
women and men respectively). 9 This is consistent to hypothesis 1 and as expected since the
introduction of preferential treatment increases the probability of winning the tournament
of women (and decreases that of men). In the public condition, we see similar trends and
tournament entry rate increased for women from 0.24 to 0.51 and decreased for men from 0.65
to 0.53 and the impacts are statistically significant (p = 0.010 and p = 0.010). In particular,
compared to the private condition, women are still underrepresented in the tournament and
the difference is significant (p = 0.047) which supports hypothesis 2(i).
Finally, as displayed in Figure 2, we observe that prosocial incentive treatment is as
effective as preferential treatment for women while keeping men’s tournament participation
more or less similar to that of the baseline in the private condition. Indeed, the actual rate
of tournament entry in prosocial incentive treatment are 0.61 for women and 0.50 for men
and the impacts, compared with the baseline, are statistically significant for women and not
for men (p = 0.092 and p = 0.326) which is consistent to hypothesis 1. On the other hand,
in the public condition, women dramatically increased their tournament entry rate from 0.24
to 0.57 (p = 0.00) but not for men. Compared to the private condition, women are no longer
underrepresented in the tournament and the difference between private and public conditions
is now insignificant (p = 0.767). This supports our hypothesis 2(ii).
Overall, the preliminary results are fairly consistent to our testing hypothesis. However,
recall that even though we randomized public and private conditions, we had some observable
differences between those groups. For example, in our sample, women in the public condition
had high willingness to pay for donation compared to women in the private condition. As
in the previous theoretically analysis, if women’s willingness to compete and willingness to
pay for donation are negatively correlated, the results regarding public observability could
be totally explained by the negative correlations between those two factors, challenging the
validity of hypothesis 2. To avoid these concerns, next we test our hypothesis using regressions
controlling for those observable characteristics.
9p-values are calculated by regressing tournament entry dummy on the dummies of preferential treatment and
prosocial incentive treatment clustered by individuals.
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4.1 Regression Analysis
In Table 3 we present the results of regressions of women’s decision to enter a tournament.
10In column (1) and (3), we restrict our sample to women in private and public conditions
respectively and regress tournament entry dummy on dummies of preferential and prosocial
incentive treatments, probability of winning a tournament11, guessed rank and risk attitudes.
Standard errors are clustered by individuals to account for the lack of independence among
the three individual observations. For preferential treatment, the effect is positive and statis-
tically significant even accounting for the change in winning probability for both private and
public conditions. For prosocial incentive treatment, we see that the effect is not statistically
significant but it is still substantial in the private condition. On the other hand, the effect of
prosocial incentive treatment is strong under public observability.
In column (2) and (4) we include WTP for donation and an interaction term between WTP
for donation and prosocial incentive treatment to explore the mechanism underlying the effect
of prosocial incentive treatment. Namely, the introduction of the donation opportunity in the
tournament environment changes the benefit associated with entering tournament especially
for women with high WTP for donation. If the effect of prosocial incentive treatment is
solely driven by women with high WTP for donation, we should observe that the coefficient
on interaction term between WTP and prosocial incentive treatment dummy to be positive
and the coefficient on prosocial incentive treatment dummy to be zero in column (2) and (4).
In the private condition, this is actually the case and is indicated in Table 3. Therefore,
we conclude that the effect of prosocial incentive treatment in the private condition is driven
by inducing women who are intrinsically motivated by the donation opportunity which is
consistent to our theoretical analysis. In addition, in the private condition, the coefficient on
WTP is negative and significant. This is also consistent to our theoretical model in which we
assumed willingness to compete and the level of altruism negatively correlate.
On the other hand, in column (4), we see that adding WTPs do not reduce the coeffi-
cient on prosocial incentive treatment and the effect is still strongly positive and significant
under public observability. Indeed, neither WTP nor the interaction term is significant in
column (4). This indicates, under public observability, women are motivated to enter the
tournament in the prosocial incentive treatment not necessarily because they are intrinsically
motivated by the donation opportunity but maybe due to other factors. This is consistent to
social image explanation of our theoretical model, i.e., the introduction of prosocial incentives
makes entering the tournament not costly from social image point of view. It also supports
our statement that the observed strong effect of prosocial incentive treatment under public
observability is not driven by having more women with high WTP in the public condition
than in the private condition. Overall, the results in Table 3 are on line with hypothesis 1
10We had to drop 4 observations since WTP for donation were missing for those observations.
11Following Niederle et al. (2013), for any given performance level at round 2, we draw 1,000,000 groups consisting
of 3 men and 3 women using our sample with replacement and calculated the frequency of wins in this set of simulated
groups.
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and 2.
To see the effect of public observability on each treatment, Table 4 reports the results
of regressions of decision to enter a tournament on the dummy of public observability by
each treatment.12 All specifications include session fixed effects and from column (3) to
(6) we include probability of winning, guessed rank and WTP for donation. Column (5)
and (6) include demographic controls such as age, mother and father’s education and major
fixed effects. In the baseline and preferential treatment, the effect of public observability
on tournament entry is negatively significant across all specifications for women. The only
treatment of which the coefficient on public observability is not significant for women is
the prosocial incentive treatment. Altogether, hypothesis 2 is supported. Finally, for men
the coefficients are statistically insignificant across all treatments and specifications. This
supports our presumption that men are not sensitive to public observability compared to
women and is consistent with the previous literature. Table 4 reports p−values for gender
differences in the coefficients of public observability. We see significant gender differences
in the coefficients on public observability of baseline and preferential treatment but not for
prosocial incentive treatment which is again consistent to our hypothesis. 13
5 Conclusion
Taking a society where the social image associated with women participating in a competition
contradicts with its cultural female gender norms at face value, it is important to explore
policies that may mitigate negative effects of social image concerns or social pressure on
women’s decision to compete. In this paper, we have demonstrated that social image concerns
negatively affect women’s decision to compete and that affirmative action policies favoring
women are not robust to such an effect. On the other hand, we show that introducing
prosocial incentives in the competitive environment is effective since (i) it induces women
who are intrinsically motivated by prosocial incentives to the competitive environment and
(ii) it makes participating in a competition not costly for women from social image point
of view. Overall, we suggest that when designing policies to promote gender equality in
competitive environments, using prosocial incentives through company philanthropy or other
social responsibility policies, either as substitutes or as complements to traditional affirmative
action policies, could be promising.
An important direction for future research is to extend our findings to investigate various
forms of prosocial incentives as in Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010, 2015), which may contribute
to the further understandings of policy design that firms can implement in order to encourage
women to enter competitions. Relatedly, aside from prosocial incentives, it might be possible
12The results do not change even if we use regressions with pooled samples standard errors clustered by individuals.
13Our theory also predicts that the amount shared to the charity in prosocial incentive treatment will increase
under public observability. We also test this prediction. The result partially supported our prediction but it was
not conclusive. We leave this point for future investigation.
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to mitigate negative social image effects through other channels as discussed in Bursztyn and
Jensen (2017). We plan to study these questions in future projects.
Finally, future work should address an extremely important open question of how policies
that are intended to encourage women to participate in a competition affects the evolution of
gender norms or the notion of gender stereotypes in the society in the long-run. One needs to
be aware of, for instance, the possibility that affirmative action policies which preferentially
treat women can generate a misconception that women are “weaker”, “less intelligent”, and
“inferior” than men, which could mislead to gender stereotypes in an undesirable way (e.g.
Levinson (2011)). An ideal policy should be the one which is effective enough in inducing
women to competitions and that breaks the glass ceiling faced by women in the long-run.
15
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Men by Private and Public Conditions
Private Public p-value
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-test
Performance (Piece-rate) 46 10 2.4 51 11 3.4 0.37
Performance (Tournament) 46 9 2 51 9.4 2.5 0.39
Performance (B) 46 9.8 2.5 51 9.6 2.9 0.72
Performance (PRE) 46 10 2.8 51 10 2.9 0.95
Performance (PRO) 46 11 3.1 51 10 3.4 0.59
Guessed Rank 46 2.9 1.1 51 2.9 1.1 0.89
Overconfidence 46 0.72 1.9 51 0.31 1.7 0.27
Risk (Self-report) 46 4.8 2.1 51 5 2.5 0.67
Risk (Lottery) 46 3.3 1.5 51 3.9 1.5 0.046
WTP for Donation 45 2.1 1.7 50 1.8 1.2 0.37
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Women by Private and Public Conditions
Private Public p-value
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-test
Performance (Piece-rate) 46 9.6 2.9 45 9.8 2.7 0.72
Performance (Tournament) 46 8.9 2.3 45 8.7 2.3 0.61
Performance (B) 46 9.4 2.7 45 9.6 2.6 0.7
Performance (PRE) 46 10 3.1 45 9.3 2.4 0.23
Performance (PRO) 46 10 3.6 45 10 3.1 0.66
Guessed Rank 46 3.2 1.1 45 3.5 1.1 0.095
Overconfidence 46 0.28 1.6 45 0.13 1.6 0.66
Risk (Self-report) 46 4.4 2.2 45 4.2 2.2 0.78
Risk (Lottery) 46 2.8 1.5 45 2.8 1.4 0.88
WTP for Donation 44 2.3 1.7 43 3.4 1.8 0.0043
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Table 3: The Effects of Preferential and Prosocial Incentive Treatments of Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
private private public public
PRE 0.161* 0.160* 0.196*** 0.194***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.068) (0.069)
PRO 0.136 -0.037 0.326*** 0.305**
(0.094) (0.096) (0.075) (0.120)
Performance (Tournament) 0.186 0.185 -0.065 -0.053
(0.153) (0.155) (0.122) (0.123)
Guessed rank -0.021 -0.021 -0.135** -0.128**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.052) (0.053)
Risk(Self-report) 0.055*** 0.053** 0.070** 0.069**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028)
Risk(Lottery) 0.058 0.057 0.025 0.019
(0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.038)
WTP for Donation -0.056** 0.018
(0.024) (0.027)
PROWTP 0.132*** 0.009
(0.041) (0.037)
Observations 132 132 129 129
Notes. The table reports regression results of tournament entry of women by private and public conditions. PRE is
the dummy of the preferential treatment. PRO is the dummy of the prosocial incentive treatment. Performance is
the probability of winning the round 2 tournament. All specifications include session fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered by individuals are in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: The Effects of Public Obserbavility by Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
men women men women men women
Baseline 0.068 -0.225** 0.083 -0.185** 0.117 -0.231***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.089) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093)
p-values for gender differences 0.032 0.029 0.004
Preferential Treatment 0.076 -0.212** 0.007 -0.196* 0.063 -0.192*
(0.103) (0.104) (0.097) (0.106) (0.102) (0.110)
p-values for gender differences 0.045 0.138 0.063
Prosocial Incentive Treatment 0.076 -0.042 0.077 -0.073 0.099 -0.073
(0.103) (0.101) (0.097) (0.105) (0.104) (0.110)
p-values for gender differences 0.403 0.273 0.215
Session FE
√ √ √ √ √ √
Performance and Psychological Attributes
√ √ √ √
Demographic Controls
√ √
Observations 97 91 94 86 93 84
Notes. The table reports regression results on the effect of public observability on tournament entry. Performance is
the probability of winning the round 2 tournament and psychological attributes include guessed rank, risk attitudes
and WTP for donation. Demographic controls include age, mother and fathers education and major fixed effects.
All specifications include session fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Figure 2: Proportion of Subjects Entering Tournaments
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B Proof of Propositions (Not for Publication)
Proof of Proposition 1. See Bursztyn et al. (2017a) Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Suppose r = 0 and ρ = 0. Then, Pr(τi = f | di = 0) = 1, since
τi = m is eliminated by applying the D1 criterion. Hence,
bP + λ ≤ wAbT − cf + λ(1− q)⇔ 0 ≤ λ ≤ wAbT − bP − cf
q
.
(ii) Suppose r = 0 and ρ = 1. Then we have
Pr(τi = f | di = 0) = (1−q)(1−r)(1−q)(1−r)+q(1−ρ) = 1,
Pr(τi = f | di = 1) = (1−q)r(1−q)r+q(1−ρ) = 0.
Therefore,
bP + λ > wAbT − cf
and bP + λ ≤ wAbT − cm = wAbT ,
therefore wAbT − bP − cf ≤ λ ≤ wAbT − bP . (iii) Suppose 0 < ρ < 1. Then note that women
with male gender types are indifferent between competing and not. Hence,
bP + λPr(τi = f | di = 0) = wAbT + λPr(τi = f | di = 1)
> wAbT − cf + λPr(τi = f | di = 1),
and thus r = 0 should be true. Then,
bP + λ
1− q
1− qρ = wAbT ⇔ ρ =
1
q
(1− λ
wAbT − bP (1− q)),
and ρ is in (0, 1) when wAbT − bP < λ ≤ wAbT−bP1−q . (iv) Suppose r = 0 and ρ = 0. Then we
have
Pr(τi = f | di = 0) = 1− q.
Off-equilibrium path Pr(τi = f | di = 1) is assumed to be zero since τi = f is eliminated by
the D1 criterion. Therefore,
bP + λ(1− q) ≥ wAbT (= wAbT − cm)⇔ λ ≥ wAbT − bP
1− q .
This completes the proof. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. First of all, we show that rT = 1. If rT < 1, ai = 0 is weakly
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preferred to ai = 1 by τi = f and thus,
w(bT + θm)− cm + λPr(τi = f | ai = 1, di = 1) < w(bT + θf )− cf + λPr(τi = f | ai = 1, di = 1)
≤ wbT − cf + λPr(τi = f | ai = 0, di = 1)
< wbT − cm + λPr(τi = f | ai = 0, di = 1),
hence, ρT = 0. It follows then, Pr(τi = f | ai = 0, di = 1) < 1 = Pr(τi = f | ai = 1, di = 1)
and so,
w(bT + θf )− cf + λPr(τi = f | ai = 1, di = 1) > wbT − cf + λPr(τi = f | ai = 0, di = 1),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, rT = 1. Secondly, we show that r = 1. Suppose r < 1.
Given that rT = 1, note that Pr(τi = f | ai = 0, di = 1) = 0 < Pr(τi = f | ai = 1, di = 1). 14
Then,
max
ai∈{0,1}
w(bT + θmai)− cm + λPr(τi = f | ai, di = 1) < w(bT + θf )− cf + λPr(τi = f | ai = 1, di = 1)
= max
ai∈{0,1}
w(bT + θfai)− cf + λPr(τi = f | ai, di = 1)
≤ bP + λPr(τi = f | di = 0).
Hence we have ρ = 0. However, it follows then Pr(τi = f | di = 0) < 1, Pr(τi = f | ai =
1, di = 1) = 1 and thus,
bP + λPr(τi = f | di = 0) < bP + λ
< w(bT + θf )− cf + λ
= max
ai∈{0,1}
w(bT + θfai)− cf + λPr(τi = f | ai, di = 1),
which is a contradiction. Therefore, r = 1. Thirdly, we show that ρ = 1. Given that r = 1
and rT = 1, this is obvious. Finally, let us solve for ρT . Suppose 0 < ρT < 1. Then,
wbT = w(bT + θm) + λ
1− q
1− q(1− ρT ) ,
must hold. Solving this, we obtain,
ρT = 1− 1
q
(1 + λ
1− q
wθm
),
and together with the condition 0 < ρT < 1, we have,
−wθm < λ < − wθm
1− q .
This completes the proof. QED
14To be more precise, we apply D1 criterion whenever paths are on off-equilibrium.
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